"Nos morituri te salutamus"
A Happy Thanksgiving to all, and I think we should all be giving thanks that we weren't the Roman Army outside of the village of Cannae two millennium ago, when they suffered arguably the most epic defeat of all time. Though, in terms of humiliation, the Seahawks' beatdown of the Broncos in Super Bowl XLVIII might come close:
A major battle in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), the Battle of Cannae came on the heels of Hannibal Barca's amazing crossing of the Alps with his army (which no one thought possible) and Hannibal inflicting punishing defeats on the Romans at Trebia and Lake Trasimene.
Consequently, after Dictator Fabius Maximus' strategy of attrition and avoiding pitched battles (which has been named after him) proved unpopular, the Senate raised the largest Roman army up to that time, eight legions plus auxilia, led by Consuls Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus to stop the Carthaginian once and for all.
What followed was a victory for Hannibal so stunning and audacious that it has been studied ever since. As you might expect, there's been plenty of ink spilled (most notably about how he pulled off what's become the text book example of a Double Envelopment), so I'd like to focus on a couple points: First, Hannibal's analysis of the enemy commanders, and second, his ability to turn the Roman army's strengths into weaknesses.
Although the Roman army may have been of unprecedented size (greatly outnumbering the Carthaginian force), Varro and Paullus disagreed on battle strategy. As a consequence, the Romans had a strange joint command arrangement, where leadership shifted between the two Consuls on a daily basis!
Thanks to the superb Carthaginian spy network, Hannibal had detailed information on both men, and he was able to use Varro's hotheadedness to trick the Romans into fighting the battle at a time and place of the Carthaginians' choice. Genius!
Next, Hannibal did an amazing job of turning the Roman army's strengths against them. Tough, disciplined, well-equipped and built around heavy infantry, the Roman army was designed to go right at their opponents like a giant armored fist.
Knowing this, Hannibal came up with an ingenious battle plan. Putting his most experienced and reliable troops, the Africans, on his flanks, the general placed himself in the middle of his front line with his Iberians and Gauls, and personally led his center into a controlled retreat.
The Romans bit on the trap, pushing forward, and Hannibal's multiethnic force gave ground, luring in their enemies. Meanwhile, the superior Carthaginian cavalry routed their opposite Latin counterparts, leaving both Roman flanks dangerously exposed.
The heavily massed Roman formation became increasingly crowded and the legionnaires lost cohesion. Hannibal's African infantry turned inward, shattering both Roman flanks as the Carthaginian cavalry returned and struck the Roman center from behind. The Roman historian Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood."
Of course, Carthage did end up losing the Second Punic War, but I think that had to do with political bickering and infighting and the Carthaginian leadership failed to give Hannibal the support needed to close out the conflict.
The Carthaginians should have kept in mind the words of Abraham Lincoln:
"A house divided against itself cannot stand."
A major battle in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC), the Battle of Cannae came on the heels of Hannibal Barca's amazing crossing of the Alps with his army (which no one thought possible) and Hannibal inflicting punishing defeats on the Romans at Trebia and Lake Trasimene.
Consequently, after Dictator Fabius Maximus' strategy of attrition and avoiding pitched battles (which has been named after him) proved unpopular, the Senate raised the largest Roman army up to that time, eight legions plus auxilia, led by Consuls Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus to stop the Carthaginian once and for all.
What followed was a victory for Hannibal so stunning and audacious that it has been studied ever since. As you might expect, there's been plenty of ink spilled (most notably about how he pulled off what's become the text book example of a Double Envelopment), so I'd like to focus on a couple points: First, Hannibal's analysis of the enemy commanders, and second, his ability to turn the Roman army's strengths into weaknesses.
Although the Roman army may have been of unprecedented size (greatly outnumbering the Carthaginian force), Varro and Paullus disagreed on battle strategy. As a consequence, the Romans had a strange joint command arrangement, where leadership shifted between the two Consuls on a daily basis!
Thanks to the superb Carthaginian spy network, Hannibal had detailed information on both men, and he was able to use Varro's hotheadedness to trick the Romans into fighting the battle at a time and place of the Carthaginians' choice. Genius!
Next, Hannibal did an amazing job of turning the Roman army's strengths against them. Tough, disciplined, well-equipped and built around heavy infantry, the Roman army was designed to go right at their opponents like a giant armored fist.
Knowing this, Hannibal came up with an ingenious battle plan. Putting his most experienced and reliable troops, the Africans, on his flanks, the general placed himself in the middle of his front line with his Iberians and Gauls, and personally led his center into a controlled retreat.
The Romans bit on the trap, pushing forward, and Hannibal's multiethnic force gave ground, luring in their enemies. Meanwhile, the superior Carthaginian cavalry routed their opposite Latin counterparts, leaving both Roman flanks dangerously exposed.
The heavily massed Roman formation became increasingly crowded and the legionnaires lost cohesion. Hannibal's African infantry turned inward, shattering both Roman flanks as the Carthaginian cavalry returned and struck the Roman center from behind. The Roman historian Polybius wrote, "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood."
Of course, Carthage did end up losing the Second Punic War, but I think that had to do with political bickering and infighting and the Carthaginian leadership failed to give Hannibal the support needed to close out the conflict.
The Carthaginians should have kept in mind the words of Abraham Lincoln:
"A house divided against itself cannot stand."
Food for thought, whereas turkey is food for the day.
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